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Synthesis, part of a Special Feature on A Framework for Analyzing, Comparing, and Diagnosing Social-Ecological Systems

A diagnostic procedure for applying the social-ecological systems framework
in diverse cases
Jochen Hinkel 1, Michael E. Cox 2, Maja Schlüter 3, Claudia R. Binder 4 and Thomas Falk 5
ABSTRACT. The framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological systems (SES) framework of Elinor Ostrom is a multitier
collection of concepts and variables that have proven to be relevant for understanding outcomes in diverse SES. The first tier of this
framework includes the concepts resource system (RS) and resource units (RU), which are then further characterized through lower
tier variables such as clarity of system boundaries and mobility. The long-term goal of framework development is to derive conclusions
about which combinations of variables explain outcomes across diverse types of SES. This will only be possible if the concepts and
variables of the framework can be made operational unambiguously for the different types of SES, which, however, remains a challenge.
Reasons for this are that case studies examine other types of RS than those for which the framework has been developed or consider
RS for which different actors obtain different kinds of RU. We explore these difficulties and relate them to antecedent work on commonpool resources and public goods. We propose a diagnostic procedure which resolves some of these difficulties by establishing a sequence
of questions that facilitate the step-wise and unambiguous application of the SES framework to a given case. The questions relate to
the actors benefiting from the SES, the collective goods involved in the generation of those benefits, and the action situations in which
the collective goods are provided and appropriated. We illustrate the diagnostic procedure for four case studies in the context of irrigated
agriculture in New Mexico, common property meadows in the Swiss Alps, recreational fishery in Germany, and energy regions in
Austria. We conclude that the current SES framework has limitations when applied to complex, multiuse SES, because it does not
sufficiently capture the actor interdependencies introduced through RS and RU characteristics and dynamics.
Key Words: common-pool resource; commons; complex commons; public good; resource system; resource unit; SES; social-ecological
system; social-ecological system framework; sustainability
INTRODUCTION
The framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological
systems (SES framework; Ostrom 2007, 2009) is a multitier
hierarchy of concepts and variables that have been identified
through extensive empirical analyses of a large number of case
studies in the context of fishery, water, and forestry common-pool
resources (McGinnis and Ostrom 2014). On the first tier, the SES
framework decomposes social-ecological systems (SES) into the
six concepts of resource system (RS), resource units (RU),
governance system (GS), actors (A), interactions (I) and
outcomes (O). Lower tiers, i.e., second, third, fourth, etc.,
decompose higher-tier concepts further into more fine-grained
variables (Fig. 1). For instance, RU is decomposed into resource
unit mobility, replacement rate, economic value, and size. The
variables have been included in the framework because they have
proven useful for explaining outcomes of resource use in empirical
analyses. Variables attributed to RS and RU, for example, are
relevant for understanding outcomes because of the challenges
that underlying biophysical or ecological characteristics of the
SES can pose for collective action and governance. The variable
“resource unit mobility” (RU1), for example, is important because
mobile resource units such as fish present challenges in
establishing ownership, responsibility, and accountability in
resource use, which in turn increases the likelihood of
overexploitation (Ostrom 2007).
The long-term goal of this framework is to facilitate the
accumulation of knowledge and to build theory across diverse
cases (Ostrom 2007, 2009). Toward this end, the SES framework
has been used for conducting large-N studies and compiling
databases to derive conclusions from diverse cases (Poteete and
Ostrom 2008, Frey and Rusch 2013). Framework applications
1

have thereby also gone beyond the classical types of resources for
which the framework was originally developed. The original SES
framework was designed to analyze settings where one group of
resource users is extracting units of a common resource stock, as
found, for example, in fishery, water, and forestry common-pool
resources. SES framework applications have, however, also
progressed toward more complex SES in which different types of
actors obtain multiple goods and services from the SES. Examples
include urban commons (Nagendra and Ostrom 2014) and
recreational fisheries (Hunt et al. 2013, Schlüter et al. 2014).
Is it feasible and justified to compare diverse types of SES and to
apply the framework to settings other than those for which it has
been originally developed? Generalizing the SES framework
beyond its original focus on common-pool resource and
accumulating insights concerning the sustainability of SES across
diverse cases is only meaningful if the framework’s concepts and
variables can be made operational unambiguously across
different types of SES. Various papers in this Special feature of
Ecology and Society have, however, shown that the interpretation
of the concepts RS and RU and their attributed variables is not
a straightforward exercise. Consider, for example, a meadow used
by farmers to graze their cows. In this case, one could either
consider the cow to be the RU or the grass to be the RU and the
cow to be representing the second-tier variable “technology used”
(A9 in Fig 1) for harvesting RU. There is no clearly superior
argument for either of these alternatives.
We aim at exploring the generalization of the SES framework and
at resolving some of the ambiguities in making its concepts
operational. We focus on the first-tier concepts of RS and RU.
This does not imply that we consider actor and governance system
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Fig. 1. The first- and second-tier concepts of the Ostrom (2009) social-ecological systems (SES) framework including minor
refinements made by McGinnis and Ostrom (2014).

variables to be less important, but RS and RU define what is called
“focal action situation” in the SES framework and thus form the
starting point for SES framework application (McGinnis and
Ostrom 2014). Our goal is to establish a diagnostic procedure in
the form of a sequence of questions that facilitates the step-wise
and consistent application of the SES framework in a given case.
The SES framework comes along as a long list of concepts and
variables that naturally raises the question where to start applying
these. From our experiences in teaching and supervising PhD and
Master’s students we know that this is actually one of the greatest
difficulty students face in using the framework. In this paper we
fill this gap by providing a sequence of questions that build upon

each-other and subsequently lead through the interpretation and
application of the various concepts and variables of the
framework.
We develop this procedure iteratively by applying it to the
following four cases: (1) Acequia irrigated agriculture in New
Mexico, (2) common property meadows in the Swiss Alps, (3)
recreational fishery in Germany, and (4) Austrian energy regions.
We selected cases of which we have first-hand knowledge to be
able to account for all subtleties of real world SES framework
application. Further, we choose the cases to be diverse and cover
the spectrum from classical common-pool resource extraction
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(irrigated agriculture) to recreational benefits (recreational
fishery), multiuse commons (common property meadows in the
Swiss Alps), and finally socio-technical commons (Austrian
energy regions).
BACKGROUND
For the development of a diagnostic procedure for the
identification of RS and RU variables in different SES cases, it is
useful to revisit the origins of the SES framework. The framework
was originally developed for situations in which resource users
extract RU from a common stock of RU, which was in turn
associated with a RS (McGinnis and Ostrom 2014). The precursor
to this is a large set of work on common-pool resources,
particularly on fishery, forestry, and water management (Gardner
et al. 1990, Ostrom et al. 1994). A common-pool resource is
defined as a resource with two characteristics: (1) subtractability
and (2) low excludability. Subtractability means that one user’s
consumption of a resource subtracts from what is available to
others. Low excludability means that it is difficult to prevent
nonusers from consuming the resource or otherwise imposing
obligations on those who use it. Binary variations along these two
dimensions have traditionally been used to create the typology of
goods provided in Table 1.
Table 1. Typology of goods.

High subtractability
Low subtractability

High excludability

Low excludability

Private good
Toll good

Common-pool resource
Public good

The motivation for such a typology is to explore what governance
challenges arise and which governance arrangements might be
most effective in managing each type of good. Traditionally,
private goods are viewed as being optimally managed by markets
or private property rights, while common-pool resources and
public goods provide more of a justification for common and
public property and management, respectively (e.g., Vatn 2005,
Weimer and Vining 2005). The reason for this is that commonpool resources and public goods create governance challenges
through what are known as externalities or collective-action
problems, which occur when public interests diverge from shortterm private interests. Public goods create public good provision
problems, such as maintaining irrigation infrastructure, where
participants must be incentivized not to free-ride on the efforts
of others to provide the public good. Common-pool resources,
meanwhile, produce appropriation problems, such as overfishing,
where participants must be incentivized to temper their
consumption of an exhaustible resource.
Although this previous work is helpful as a basis for the
development of the framework, the basic typology of goods
suffers from several weaknesses. To begin, in practice each
dimension (subtractability, excludability) fluctuates along a
continuum. The line between common-pool resources and public
goods is a fuzzy one, being delineated by their differences in the
dimension of subtractability, and economists sometimes finesse
this issue by talking about the “congestability” of public goods
(Weimer and Vining 2005), which amounts to stating that some
goods have thresholds of use above which their use is subtractable,

and below which it is less so, such as traffic on highways. This is
really no different than the subtractability of common-pool
resources such as fish in a lake: if a fisherman takes only so much
that the fish can regenerate, then this use is not very subtractable.
This highlights another weakness of the typology of goods: the
attribute of subtractability is specific to a period of time.
Regarding excludability, similar comments can be made: it is more
a continuum than a binary distinction, and it is not only an
inherent feature of a resource but also a feature of a relationship
between the resource and other important factors such us
available technologies or financial and physical resources.
These issues illustrate that it is difficult to use the typology of
goods as a basis for characterizing the governance challenges
associated with a given good as well as for teasing out what might
be the most effective governance structure for it. The SES
framework has moved beyond the simple typology of goods and
the simple association of governance arrangements to these types
of goods in that it considers more attributes of RS and RU beyond
subtractability and excludability. The extended list of attributes
fulfills the same role as the typology of goods: they help us to
better understand the governance challenges that arise in SES and
to understand which governance arrangements are effective for
preserving the SES. The core idea therefore is that RS and RU
variables characterize the kind of interdependence between actors
that arise through interactions mediated via a biophysical system
(Anderies et al. 2004). Table 2 illustrates this for exemplary RS
and RU variables.
Table 2. The role of diverse variables of the social-ecological
systems framework in contributing to the likelihood of selforganizing to prevent overexploitation of the resource system
(RS). RU = resource units.
RS and RU variables
Size of resource system
(RS3)

Outcomes: Likelihood of self-organization
(LOSO) to prevent overexploitation

For large RS the LOSO is low because of
the high cost of defining boundaries,
monitoring usage, and gaining ecological
knowledge. For small RS, LOSO is low
because of the little RU generated (Ostrom
2009).
Predictability of system If predictability is low, then the LOSO is
dynamics (RS7)
also low, because then users cannot foresee
how self-organization would help them to
maintain income from the RS (Ostrom
2009).
Resource unit mobility If RU are mobile, then the LOSO decreases,
(RU1)
because it is more difficult to establish
ownership, responsibility, and
accountability for the use of the RU
(Ostrom 2007).
Economic values (RU4) If RU have high economic value, then the
LOSO may increase or decrease, depending
on other factors (Ostrom 2007).
Distinctive markings
If RU naturally have or can artificially be
(RU6)
marked distinctively, then it is easier to
establish effective property rights and the
LOSO increases (Ostrom 2007).
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Table 3. Diagnostic procedure.
Step

Question

1

What is the research question? Social-ecological systems (SES; or any other systems) can only be conceptualized with respect to a research
question. The question is needed to reduce the complexity of the SES to certain collective goods and the action situations most relevant
for answering the question, i.e., delineate the system’s boundaries. It also determines the outcomes of interest and the level of aggregation
at which the system should be analyzed (Schlüter et al. 2014). All the subsequent questions of the procedure need to be answered with
respect to the research question.
Which actors (A) obtain which benefits from the SES? Benefits are understood widely, including instrumental, moral, aesthetic values,
current vs. future values, direct vs. indirect values, option values, etc.
Which collective goods are involved in the generation of these benefits? Several goods may be involved in the generation of a single benefit
and several of these may be collective. For example, the benefit of recreational angling may involve the collective goods “catching fish” as
well as “enjoying an undisturbed place for angling.”
Are any of the collective goods obtained subtractable? If so, an appropriation action situation arises where activities subtract from a stock
of resource units (RU). For nonsubtractable goods there is no need to consider the variables of the RU.
What are the biophysical and/or technological processes involved in the generation of the stock of RU? These will collectively be called the
resource system (RS). Multiple RS may be relevant and several types of RU may be obtained from the same RS.
How do the variables of RS and RU characterize the appropriation-related governance challenges? Now that the concepts of RS and RU
have been defined for the particular SES studied, the second-tier variables of RS and RU can be applied to further characterize the
governance challenges at hand.
What kind of institutional arrangements have emerged as a response to the appropriation action situation governance challenge? This
question forms the entry point to making A and governance system (GS) variables operational.
Which actors contribute to the provision, maintenance, or improvement of the RS and by what input (labor, resources, etc.)? This defines a
provision action situation associated with a particular RS. In the case that nonsubtractable collective goods are obtained from the RS, this
action situation is the provisioning of a pure public good. This and the following two questions need to be addressed for each RS.
How do the variables of RS characterize the provisioning action situation related governance challenge? Similarly to the appropriation
action situation, a provisioning action situation may be further characterized by the variables of the RS.
What kind of institutional arrangements have emerged as a response to the provisioning action situation governance challenge?

2
3

4
5
6

7
8

9
10

DIAGNOSTIC PROCEDURE
The discussion so far has consequences for the interpretation of
RS and RU and the variables associated with these in the SES
framework. First, we subsume public goods and common-pool
resources within a broader category of collective goods, and
define these as goods and services that have nontrivial costs of
exclusion, irrespective of institutional arrangements.
Second, framework interpretation is not about interpreting
variables per se, but about interpreting variables in accordance
with their role in explaining outcomes. The general role of RS/
RU variables is to characterize governance challenges in relation
to two types of canonical action situations: (1) Provisioning
action situation: those in which users face a collective challenge
to create, maintain, or improve a collective good. An example
would be farmers maintaining a common irrigation system. (2)
Appropriation action situation: those in which actors face a
collective challenge to avoid the overuse of a collective good. An
example would be farmers appropriating water from a common
irrigation system. Note that generally, SES analysis must consider
further action situations such as those of monitoring or collective
and constitutional choice, but because these do not have a direct
implication for how to make RS/RU variables operational, we do
not address them in this paper.
We interpret appropriation action situation in a sense wider than
its original one, because we also wish to include what was called
congestible public goods above, e.g., using a road or enjoying a
lake for recreational purposes. Here, we define appropriation
action situation to consist of actors carrying out activities that
(1) depend upon a common stock, and (2) subtract from that
stock. Only pure public goods (with zero subtractability) are
excluded from this definition.

Originally, the SES framework considered extraction of RU as
the only kind of activity that affected a stock of RU. This blurred
the distinction between the stock and the activity of extracting
units from it. Consequently, the stock was considered to be a
common-pool resource, a collective and subtractable good. This
is in line with the classical interpretation of natural resource goods
in resource economics, where resources are tangible components
of nature used as inputs to economic transformation processes
(Vatn 2005).
When, however, considering other activities that affect and are
affected by the stock (beyond extracting RU), it turns out that
defining just the stock to be a subtractable collective good is not
useful, because a stock is not subtractable per se, but only in
relation to a certain activity. Considering a fish stock, for example,
the activity of commercial fishing subtracts fully from the stock,
while recreational angling might only do so partially because fish
are often returned to the lake after having been caught. Further,
the activity of simply watching the fish stock in a clear water lake
may not subtract at all from the stock and hence there is no
appropriation action situation. Similar arguments apply for
excludability: the cost of excluding people from angling may be
lower than the cost of excluding people from watching the fish
stock. Here, we thus consider the stock together with an activity
of using, consuming or enjoying the stock to be the collective
good of interest for SES framework application.
Finally, the distinction between stocks of RU and the RS needs
some attention. In the SES framework the two concepts are closely
linked in a one-to-one relationship: One set of RU belongs to one
RS (Ostrom 2007, Hinkel et al. 2014). Here, we generalize this
and define the RS to be the biophysical and technological
processes that create, maintain and improve stocks of RU. One
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Fig. 2. Appropriation and provisioning action situations for the Acequia irrigated agriculture in New Mexico.
RU = resource units, RS = resource system.

RS may thus include several interacting stocks of different kinds
of units. The essential difference between RU and RS in our
refinement is that the former is a stock and the latter is a set of
processes (or flows) relating the stocks. This is in line with
Ostrom’s earlier definition that the RS “creates the conditions for
the existence of a stock of resource units” (Ostrom et al. 1994:8).
We turned these insights into a procedure in the form of a sequence
of questions that can be applied as a step-by-step methodology
for conceptualizing SES and analyzing governance challenges
using the SES framework (Table 3). This procedure starts with
general questions about the context and motivation and proceeds
with more specific questions regarding the action situations
involved.
CASE APPLICATIONS
Acequia irrigated agriculture in New Mexico
The acequia farmers in northern New Mexico are the descendants
of the Spanish colonists who moved north along the Rio Grande
from Mexico beginning around 1600. They brought with them
several Spanish irrigation traditions, most importantly the
institutional regime of common property (Rivera 1998). Water
within each acequia is considered common property, and
compliance with community obligations is required for an
individual to maintain his/her individual water rights. Each
farmer belongs to an acequia and there are roughly 51 acequias
in Taos valley, each with an average of around 40 members.
Each acequia has a well-defined government, led by a mayordomo
and three commissioners. The mayordomo decides how water is
distributed within his or her acequia and monitors for infractions.
The commissioners serve several administrative, legislative, and
judicial roles. They are frequently called on to arbitrate disputes
and support the mayordomo in enforcing ditch rules. The acequias
in Taos valley in northern New Mexico, which is the focus of this
case application, have sustained themselves as self-sufficient
irrigation systems for hundreds of years by adapting to high desert
conditions and inevitable periods of drought. This leads us to the
first step in the diagnostic procedure: the research question (see
Cox 2014 for a more in depth application of the SES framework
to the Taos acequias).
Research question: Which social and biophysical properties have
enabled the Taos acequia SES to historically persist in the face of
droughts and general environmental scarcity?
Appropriation action situation characterized through RS/RU
variables: The focal appropriation action situation is the classical
one of extracting water from a common stock, which is done by
all of the acequia farmers (Fig. 2). The use of water for irrigation

is fairly subtractable, although the acequias do return a portion
of the water to the main canal or river from which they extract it.
The RU (water stock) is mobile (RU1) and highly spatially and
temporally heterogeneous (RU7), which increases the cost of
extraction and monitoring.
Institutional response to appropriation action situation:
Acequias have a multilevel governance structure (GS3) enabled
by key actors (the mayordomos and commissioners) that provide
leadership roles within acequias, and act as bridging agents
between them to support larger-scale collective action. Water
rights are given proportionally to farmers as they contribute to
community obligations. Finally, a decentralized monitoring
system (GS8) enabled by geographic proximity (U4) and property
rights arrangements (GS4) is also important. Farmers
automatically monitor their neighbors when it is their turn to
irrigate in a rotational rights system, and when water does not
reach their ditch they have little trouble “walking up the ditch”
to find out who is taking water out of turn.
Provisioning action situation characterized through RS/RU
variables: The resource system is the hydrological system together
with the network of irrigation canals and headgates that the
acequias use to manage and direct their water. Without the
irrigation infrastructure (RS4), there would not be sufficient water
for all farmers, because the storage characteristic (RS8) and the
productivity (RS5) of the RS are low. Collective action is
necessary, because no single farmer could maintain the
infrastructure alone.
Institutional response to provisioning action situation:
Maintenance is organized using property rights (GS4) that
proportion maintenance duties to the amount of water extraction
rights. Acequia leaders (A5) lead and monitor maintenance tasks.
Common property meadows in the Swiss Alps
The common property meadows in the Swiss Alps provide
important services such as income sources for farmers via direct
use as well as through tourism, protection from soil erosion, water
runoff, and landslides, and high biodiversity (Tasser et al. 2007;
Biodiversitäts-Monitoring Schweiz, http://www.biodiversitymonitoring.
ch/). These services are highly dependent on continuous
management of the alpine meadows. In Switzerland, most alpine
summer pastures are common property and have been managed
by local governance systems since the Middle Ages. Today,
farmers collectively produce milk and cheese, which is distributed
to individual farmers. Societal changes, like industrialization,
rapid economic growth, and new agricultural policies, such as
changes in the subsidy system, have induced major transitions of
the pasture management system, leading to either intensification
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Fig. 3. Appropriation and provisioning action situations for common property meadows in the Swiss Alps. RU
= resource units, RS = resource system.

or abandonment of land with an associated loss of meadows and
their biodiversity. At the same time, local farmers’ major source
of income has shifted from farming to tourism, with tourists being
attracted by the beautiful cultural landscape of the meadows. For
a comprehensive treatment of this case see Baur and Binder
(2013).
Research question: How have the local governance systems of
common property meadows in the Swiss Alps adapted to deal
with societal changes?
Appropriation action situation characterized through RS/RU
variables: For this case, we identified three collective goods to be
relevant (Fig. 3). For the appropriation of grass, the interpretation
of RU variables is straightforward. Grass is not mobile (RU1),
has a growth rate (RU2), and a spatial/temporal distribution
(RU7). We did not consider the appropriation of milk and cheese
from the collective production because this is not a collective good
because excludability is high. Considering tourists arrivals as a
stock is a bit unusual, but the interpretation of RU variables is
also straightforward. A number of tourists (RU5) are visiting the
meadows and farmers “appropriate” tourists buying
accommodation, food, and drinks from them. The third
appropriation action situation, tourist enjoying the landscape,
depends upon two stocks: the grass of the meadow as well as the
locations for enjoying the landscape. Only the second one is
partially subtractable. Such dependencies are not captured in the
original SES framework. Our refinement, which distinguishes
between the stocks of RU and the activities of using the stocks,
allows for the representation of these dependencies between
multiple actors, multiple activities, and multiple stocks in, e.g.,
tabular format (Fig. 3).
Institutional response to appropriation action situation: For
centuries local governance systems have avoided overuse of the
meadows by strictly defining (1) the distribution of use rights and
yield, i.e., number of cows allowed on the pastures and
distribution among farmers); (2) the duties connected to the use
of the resource, e.g., communal work; and (3) the sanctions for
noncompliance (Netting 1981, Kissling-Näf et al. 2002,
Tiefenbach and Mordasini 2006). The cheese produced is
distributed to the farmers according to the relative amount of

milk produced by each farmer’s cows, which is measured twice
a month.
The central governance challenge in this SES has, however,
shifted from the appropriation action situation to the
provisioning action situation of maintaining the RS by sending
sufficient numbers of cows to the meadow. This is jeopardized
by a constantly decreasing number of farmers in the region,
leading to areas of the RS with intensive use and other areas
where bush and forest growth is predominant (Baur and Binder
2013).
Provisioning action situation characterized through RS/RU
variables: The RS is large (RS3) so that it cannot be maintained
by a single farmer. Predictability (RS7) is relatively high, which
increases the likelihood of self-organization.
Institutional response to provisioning action situation: Fees have
to be paid if a farmer does not do the work allocated to sending
a cow to the Alps. In order to be able to send enough cows to
the meadows, the “import” of cows recently has been allowed.
Recreational fishery in Germany
Recreational fisheries are the dominant users of freshwater and
major coastal fish stocks in industrialized countries (Arlinghaus
and Cook 2009). In Western Germany they are managed by
angling associations and local angling clubs that have the right
to fish but also the duty to manage their water bodies sustainably.
They regulate access and perform management activities in
accordance with their fishing rights, angler preferences, angling
club rules, and regional and national fisheries laws. Stocking,
that is, the introduction of fish from a hatchery or a different
water body into an existing fish population, is one of the most
commonly applied management measures. However, its
economic efficiency, social implications, and ecological effects
are often not known. It is assumed that attributes of both the
social system, e.g., angler preferences, and the ecological system,
e.g., habitat conditions, determine the outcome of stocking
measures. Whether an outcome is considered sustainable is
evaluated based on ecological, social, and economic indicators,
such as the replacement rate of wild fish by hatchery fish, the
social welfare of the club or the economic performance.
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Fig. 4. Appropriation and provisioning action situations for recreational fisheries in Germany. RU = resource
units, RS = resource system.

Research question: Can stocking enhance the sustainability of
recreational fisheries?
Appropriation action situation characterized through RS/RU
variables: We have identified two subtractable collective goods
and hence focal appropriation action situation relevant for the
angler’s benefit of recreational angling (Fig. 4). The first one is
“catching fish,” i.e., the appropriation of fish from the fish stock
(RU) provided by the water body (RS). The fish stock is only
partially subtractable as recreational anglers often benefit from
catching the fish without actually harvesting and thus consuming
it. Under-size fish and larger fish are often returned to the water
body. This appropriation action situation is characterized by the
RU being mobile (RU1) and not distinctively marked (RU6),
which makes it difficult to monitor the state of the stock. If the
RS is large (RS3) and productive (RS5), RU are less scarce and
the governance challenge is smaller.
The second appropriation action situation relevant is the
appropriation of an undisturbed location for enjoying the angling
experience as at least some anglers benefit less if water bodies are
crowded with anglers. Here, the stock of RU, i.e., the angling
locations, is not mobile (RU1) and does not grow (RU2). The
location (RS9) and size of the RS (RS3) can be of relevance
because a larger water body that is more remote poses less
governance challenges than a small water body in a densely
populated region. Our generalization of the appropriation action
situation allows representing these kinds of situations, which
would have been difficult to capture in the classical SES
framework.
Institutional response to appropriation action situation: Access
restrictions through angling clubs and angling permits.
Provisioning action situation characterized through RS/RU
variables: The main provision action situation relevant for the
research question is stocking and the governance challenge is
characterized by the difficulty of determining the optimal
stocking strategy and keeping anglers from fishing out the newly
stocked fish. Predictability of system dynamics (RS7) is low both
because of natural variability as well as uncertainty about the
effect of stocking on the fish population. The size of the fish
population (RU5) is difficult to measure because of the RU’s
mobility (RU1) and their high spatial and temporal variability
(RU7). Because of these characteristics, the perceived angling
experience can be very different from the actual ecological
situation, e.g., anglers think that there is not enough fish while
actually fish populations are in good condition. This may lead to

angling club managers being subject to social pressure from
anglers. A related issue is that stocked fish can also affect other
fish species, which can create conflict between anglers, e.g.,
between carp and other anglers. Stocking might also lead to a
lack of genetic diversity that could potentially affect the longterm sustainability of the fish stocks.
Institutional response to provisioning action situation: Because
of this low predictability, stocking is often carried out following
habits, rules of thumb, influence of powerful anglers, or mainly
to show that the angling club leadership is active without really
aiming at enhancing the fish stock. Anglers have to pay club
membership fees that are used to finance stocking activities. Clubs
might develop rules that restrict access to newly stocked water
bodies for a certain period of time. Additionally there are national
and regional laws that restrict stocking of particular species or
water bodies.
Energy regions in Austria
To explore the application of the SES framework to cases that are
very different from those upon which it has been developed, we
also provide a preliminary application to the social-technical
systems (STS) of Austrian energy regions. These systems are in
many respects similar to SES if one considers the technical
subsystem to be the RS. Energy regions in Austria are regional
initiatives, which usually envision energy self-sufficiency by
decreasing energy demand and using regional renewable energy
sources and building a decentralized energy infrastructure
(Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Innovation und Technologie,
http://www.energiesystemederzukunft.at). In Austria, energy
regions have emerged since the 1990s and today there are 66
“climate and energy model regions” including 773 municipalities
with 1.7 million inhabitants.
There is evidence that the transition to such model regions
provides further benefits such as new jobs, the establishment of
new companies, and sectors like “eco-energy tourism” and
educational programs, which consequently have raised the
acceptance and interest of the population (Späth 2007). Even
though several studies have analyzed technical and operational
issues of energy production, the relationship between the energy
producing system, actors, and the governance system underlying
or supporting such transformation processes have hardly been
studied. This case study compares the development of two
Austrian energy regions with different environmental conditions
and different governance structures. The SES thereby is the basis
upon which the data is collected and made comparable between
these two case studies.
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Fig. 5. Appropriation and provisioning action situations for Austrian energy regions. RU = resource units, RS =
resource system.

Research question: Which technological and resource proprieties,
as well as policies and socioeconomic processes, have shaped the
transition of regions to energy regions? Which types of energy
governance arrangements have emerged?
Appropriation action situation characterized through RS/RU
variables: Intuitively, one could consider the appropriation action
situation here to be similar to the standard resource extraction
one: Households and firms (A) extract electric energy (RU) from
the energy system (Fig. 5). What is distinct in this case, however,
is that these actors may also feed electric energy into the electrical
system. An important question is then, what is the stock of RU?
It cannot be a stock of electric energy, because electric energy
cannot be stored, but can only be converted into other forms of
energy. Relevant stocks impacted by withdrawing and feeding-in
activities are the capacities to convert energy either in the form of
switching on power plants when demand increases or switching
on storage facilities in the form of, say, batteries of mobile vehicles
or a pumped-storage hydroelectricity. Nevertheless, the
interpretation of some RS variables is straightforward. The RS
is fully constructed by humans (RS4) and the system boundaries
are clear (RS2). Storage is limited (RS8) with the specific
equilibrium property that electric energy extracted from and fed
into the grid must be equal at all times (RS6).
RU variables are more difficult to interpret. If one would consider
electric energy to be the RU then the straight forward
interpretation would be that this is mobile (RU1). Here, however,
we consider, for reasons given above, the “unused capacity of
energy conversion and storage” to be the relevant stock of RU.
This stock is certainly less or not mobile with the exception of
electric vehicles. This interpretation is also in line with the
explanatory role that the variable mobility has in the SES
framework, namely that RU mobility increases the costs of
extraction and monitoring because it is difficult to know where
the RU are (Ostrom 2007). Knowing where the energy is, is
certainly not an issue in the case of energy feed-in, transmission,
and withdrawal.
Institutional response to appropriation action situation: New
over-regional governance bodies emerged (including several
Gemeinden), which are responsible for the infrastructure and set
the rules for the subsidy conditions at the local level.
Provisioning action situation characterized through RS/RU
variables: Maintaining the RS (balance between demand and
supply) has been made more difficult through the inclusion of

more renewable energy producers as this decreases predictability
(RS7). This may be addressed by either increasing the size of the
system (RS3), which in turn increases predictability (RS7) as
demand and supply are then easier to balance, or by installing
additional storage capacity (RS8), both of which requires large
investments.
Institutional response to provisioning action situation:
Addressing the provisioning governance challenge requires the
construction of an infrastructure that is able to balance the high
volatility of renewable energy production. This requires
investment in sufficient capacity for storage supplemented by
producer/consumer agreements.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We have presented a procedure for clearly defining RS and RU in
the context of an analysis of a particular SES case. The procedure
includes a set of 10 questions, which guide the interpretation and
application of the SES framework through the identification of
the actors involved, the benefits obtained, and the collective
action situations relevant for generating these benefits. The
procedure provides for a more systematic and transparent
interpretation of RU and RS and selection of relevant second tier
variables, thus enhancing consistency and comparability across
cases as well as facilitating scientific communication. This
procedure was developed and tested iteratively by applying it to
diverse cases and has thereby enabled us to better compare our
case studies. We also have tested and further developed this
procedure through applying it to a larger number of cases together
with Master’s students in university courses.
The diagnostic procedure facilitates making RS and RU variables
operational for nonstandard SES framework applications
through two refinements to the SES framework. First, we have
made explicit the distinction between stocks of RU on one hand
and activities that affect the stocks on the other hand. Both the
stock and the activity together should be called a common-pool
resource (subtractable, collective good) and not only the former,
as stocks are not subtractable per se, but only with respect to
activities of enjoying, using, or consuming the stock.
Second, we interpret RU variables as referring to the stock of RU
and not to individual units (see also Hinkel et al. 2014). This way,
RU mobility refers to the mobility of the stock within the RS.
This means that a stock of fish is highly mobile, a stock of water
in an irrigation system is less mobile (i.e., the stock is constrained
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to the channels) and a stock of “unused capacity of energy
conversion” in a transmission grid is hardly mobile. Heterogeneity
in spatial distribution combined with high mobility exacerbates
the challenge of assigning and enforcing rights and obligations
with respect to a RU (Gardner et al. 1990).

then is it meaningful to compare such cases and build theory
across them. Irrespective of this challenge, the current SES
framework is certainly a useful entry point for SES analysis and
can serve as a general language for speaking about complex SES.

Nevertheless, two major challenges for applying the SES
framework to complex SES remain. First, the SES framework
does not capture interdependencies in complex commons where
multiple types of actors carry out multiple activities that depend
on and affect multiple RU and RS. Unfortunately, given the
current intensity of human-environment interactions, these
complex systems are the rule rather than the exception (Steins and
Edwards 1999). In this context, the SES framework does not
provide means to capture how multiple uses and benefits are
connected, which however is exactly what generates the
governance challenges.

Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/7023

Second, the SES framework does not represent the dynamic
aspects of RU stocks and activities of actors. For example, in the
case of the activity of extracting water, the stock regenerates
gradually, whereas in the case of occupying a location for angling,
the stock regenerates fully and instantaneously after the activity
has stopped. In the case of using electrical power, both starting
and stopping the activity negatively impacts the stocks of
available energy storage and conversion. The variables of the
framework that relate to RS and RU dynamics, including
equilibrium properties (RS6), predictability of system dynamics
(RS7), storage characteristics (RS8), and growth or reproductive
rate (RU2), are difficult to interpret, overlap in meanings, and do
not capture these differences unambiguously. Particular
challenges in making these variables operational arise because of
multiple levels of ecological organization (Hinkel et al. 2014) and
nonlinear and threshold dynamics that are very common in SES
(Walker et al. 2004, Walker and Meyers 2004).
A further issue that arose in interpreting RS and RU variables
was that some of these frequently depend on the ways in which
humans have altered RS and RU through human constructed
facilities (RS4). For example, the value of the variables growth or
replacement rate (RS2), clarity of system boundaries (RS3),
storage characteristics (RS8), distinctive characteristics (RU6),
and spatial and temporal distribution (RU7) may all be altered
by human interventions such as building irrigation infrastructure,
constructing reservoirs, or artificially marking boundaries of RS
or RU (see Appendix 1). Because these interventions alter the
characteristics of the collective goods provided, it would be
beneficial to know the values of these variables both with and
without the intervention to be able to generalize findings across
different SES. Future framework development should attempt to
draw this distinction.
Addressing these challenges could imply making rather radical
changes to the SES framework. In particular, when considering
complex multiuse SES, it might make sense to replace RS and RU
concepts with the concept of the extended appropriation action
situation developed here and to further classify these
appropriation action situations according to the interdependence
that arises through the characteristics of the goods and services
obtained within this type of action situation. The challenge
thereby would be to characterize these situations with variables
that fulfill the same explanatory role in diverse SES, because only
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Appendix 1. Comparative interpretation of resource system (RS) and resource unit (RU) variables in the four cases.

